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THE WILLIAMSBURG CONSENSUS REVISITED
JAMES

G. FRANCE*

Court delay, scarcely a recent phenomenon, has worried scholars
for many years; only recently, however, has the effort to eradicate
it been concerted. Comparatively new organizations, such as the
Institute of Judicial Administration, the Institute for Court Management, the Federal Judicial Center, and the National Center for
State Courts, together with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), have led this recent effort, while the American Bar Association, its foundation, and the American Judicature
Society have been less active. Each organization, to some degree,
has posited that improvement of the quality and timespan of the
litigation process, both civil and criminal, can be achieved by improving judges' pay and tenure, streamlining court structure, revising court procedure, or utilizing parajudicial talent to handle nondecisional functions such as calendaring and case processing.
In March 1971, representatives from these and other similar organizations attended a National Conference on the Judiciary in
Williamsburg, Virginia, financed largely by LEAA, to analyze court
problems and to develop solutions. After a series of speeches and
small-group discussions, the Conference arrived at a Consensus
Statement' on the remedies to be pursued. Predictably, adequate
compensation and tenure of judges were emphasized, 'as was the
single-level trial court with accompanying abolition of specialized
family and traffic courts and justices of the peace. Parajudicial
administrative talent also was endorsed, although the extent to
which court administrators should be used in calendaring and case
processing operations was left unclear. Only the question of revising
court procedures was unemphasized, possibly because most states
already had undertaken such revision.
Of the suggested improvements, only those relating to judicial
tenure and increased pay lacked a logical basis. It might have been
*A.B., Brown University; LL.B., Yale Law School. Professor of Law, University of Akron
School of Law. The author is indebted to Mr. James Wakefield, third-year student at the
University of Miami Law School, for field research and data from south and central Florida
circuit courts. Field research was ended in May 1974 in order to prepare this Article for
publication; any subsequent developments within the states surveyed thus are not reflected
in the analysis.
1. Findings and Conclusions of the National Conference of the Judiciary, Consensus Statement, Williamsburg, Virginia, March 11-14, 1971, in 55 J. AM. Jun. Soo'v 29 (1971).
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more rational to use these carrots to reward increased productivity
after it is achieved than to hope that before-the-fact charity would
lead to improved performance, especially since the recipients themselves were partially to blame for existing court delay. Providing
parajudicial assistance to lighten judges' administrative workloads
also would be inconsistent with increased judicial compensation.
Other reforms that were stressed, however, seemed sufficiently
reasonable to justify evaluation of their actual effect. Some state
court systems had fully integrated or unified structures, and some
already used parajudicial administrative personnel to conduct their
affairs. These states should have been models of efficiency for others
to follow; assuming other variables were constant, the states with
uncluttered structures and no duplication of court function and
those using parajudicial managerial talent should have concluded
their cases more quickly and more systematically than those with a
myriad of overlapping jurisdictions or those in which judges had to
do their own housekeeping. This result appeared so logical that for
a time it went untested.
For these reasons, a seven-state comparative time-lapse study
was conducted. 2 The timespan of tort jury litigation was measured
in each state at a time shortly before the Conference met. If the
Consensus Statement was correct, then states with streamlined
structures andthose with extensive use of outside managerial talent
should have shown faster and generally more efficient case processing than states relying on traditional organization and personnel.
The results of the study, however, were precisely opposite. Four
states, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana, conformed
more to the desired structural model than did the other three, although they varied among themselves in the degree of conformity.
2. See France, JudicialAdministration: The Williamsburg Consensus-Some Errors and
Omissions, 14 Wif. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JudicialAdministration].
The seven states studied were Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. Id. at 15, Table I.
For an explanation of the measurement techniques used in the seven-state study, see id.
at 7-14. The followup study discussed in this Article utilized the same methods, consisting
primarily of the measurement of the time taken to dispose of various percentages of the tort
cases filed in the court being measured. This method facilitates constant monitoring of courts
to evaluate their performance for different filing years, thereby enabling direct comparison
of the current study's results with those of the earlier study.
3. For consideration of the reasons for using the personal injury tort case for comparative
studies of civil litigation performance, see id. at 9-10.
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Yet these states had the poorest disposition record in tort litigation. 4

Far better records were exhibited by Florida, South Carolina, and
Tennessee, each of which contained a welter of courts with overlap-

ping jurisdictions.5 Moreover, among the four states with systems
approaching the recommended model, the greater the degree of
court integration, the poorer the performance. New Jersey's system,
the most advanced in terms of interchangeable judges, was the most
time consuming.6 Louisiana's system, which closely approximated
a single-court structure, performed almost as slowly as New Jersey's

in the later stages of litigation, although there was some speculation
that operational defects in addition to the structural pattern contributed to this result.7 The less integrated Pennsylvania and Ohio
courts performed significantly better than New Jersey courts during

most stages of the litigation process."
Conversely, the more grievous the structural disorganization, the
faster cases moved. In South Carolina, which had only two sets of
trial courts of record, one of limited and one of general jurisdiction,
and in which lack of uniformity of jurisdictional limits was the main
structural problem, performance was considerably less commendable than in Florida and Tennessee. 9 In Florida, where the use of
justices of the peace was more extensive, but where very few civil
and criminal courts of record were created to take up the jurisdictional slack of the circuit court system, progress was measurably
slower than in Tennessee." This last state, whose performance excelled, had, and now has to an even greater degree, a bewildering
array of dual-system law and chancery courts organized on a statewide basis with overlapping boundary lines, as well as separate
criminal courts" and varying jurisdictional standards for its limited
4. Id. at 15, Table 11.
5. Id. at 17-18.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 16 & n.30, 37-38.
8. Id. at 16-17.
9. Id. at 15. Table II.
lo. Id.
11. These criminal courts typify the complexity of Tennessee's court structure. The courts,
of circuit court status, were created primarily in Tennessee's four major metropolitan counties, but also are found in multi-county circuits in east and middle Tennessee. One of these
courts was created as the 26th Judicial Circuit, with jurisdiction in only one county (Sullivan). The 26th Circuit crosses the boundaries of the 20th Circuit; this latter court retains civil
and criminal jurisdiction in all the counties within its circuit except Sullivan County, where
it has only civil jurisdiction. The 5th Circuit has a separate criminal judge for its 11 counties,
while the 25th Circuit has been created to handle only civil matters in five of these counties.
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jurisdiction General Sessions courts. Interlaced with these courts
were six third-level general jurisdiction civil courts for the state's
12

medium-size communities.
Unpredicted results also were obtained from a comparison of the
use of parajudicial talent in each state. Thus, Tennessee, with an
efficient administrative staff at the supreme court level but no court
administrator or even an assignment clerk in any of its circuit courts
or chancery divisions, had the least delay of any of the states measured.' 3 Florida, which had the next best record," had no administrative staff at the time of measurement, not even at the supreme
court level. The results were substantially poorer in South Carolina,
where local court administrators were not used. The rotation of
judges among circuits may have had some effect on case-flow management, and the results may be explained at least partially by the
use of the bar-control system of calendaring in this state.'" Nevertheless, South Carolina had less delay than states using trial court
administrators, indicating that parajudicial docket control may be
less efficient than the seemingly more disorganized system of bar
control.
Each of the four remaining states, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and New Jersey, had some form of trial court administrative help.
Yet this entire group of administered-trial-court states was substantially slower in dispositions than the unadministered states."
Within the administered group, an increased degree of administration did not lead to speedier disposition, at least not in the earlier
stages of litigation. Administrative help in Louisiana and Pennsylvania was recent and covered only a small portion of the court
system; trial court administration in New Jersey and Ohio was general, at least in the more populous counties, and had been estabThus there are two civil circuits co-terminous with a single criminal circuit. See 1971 ExEc.
SWc'Y SuP. CT. op TwNN. REP. 38, 42, 44.
12. Each court covers a single county in an area where there are only multi-county circuits
and chancery divisions. Four courts use the circuit and chancery clerks and clerks-masters
in their counties for recordkeeping; a fifth, called the Common Law and Chancery Court, has
in addition probate and juvenile jurisdiction and has its own clerk; the sixth was created in
1972. Integrating these courts into a consolidated circuit-chancery superior court was recommended by a consultant's report, INsTrrr oF JumaL ADm sTRATION, THE JuDicl SYsTFi
op TNNESsE 55 (1971).
13. JudicialAdministration 25.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id. at 15, Table 11.
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lished over a longer period of time. The former two states definitely
were quicker in disposing of the first 60 percent of their cases, although they fell behind the latter two states thereafter."7
The study's results, although startling to devotees of court
streamlining and use of nonjudicial administrators, may have had
limited credibility, since some of the states studied were affected by
more than one variable. Tennessee and Florida, for example, had
cluttered, overlapping-jurisdiction courts and did not utilize trial
court administrators; Ohio and New Jersey had streamlined courts
that were fully administered. Poor performance or superior efficiency therefore could not be attributed entirely to either factor.
.Moreover, other factors clouded the results.18
Nevertheless, the seven-state time-in-process measurements suggested that none of the standard remedies had improved efficiency
when adopted. Unfortunately, the study neither specified which
remedies were ineffective nor indicated where geography alone was
responsible. Such a side-by-side test could not allow one group of
states to experiment with a single remedy while other states acted
as a control. However valuable such an experiment might be, no
state would be likely to concentrate on only one method of improving court efficiency when reformers urged the simultaneous adop17. Id.
18. Tennessee, which excelled in performance, had the most inferior trial court judicial pay
scale and tenure conditions; Pennsylvania and New Jersey, both relatively poor performers,
had the best paid judges with the most secure tenure. Id. at 21. This data would indicate an
inverse relationship between productivity and working conditions, an almost intolerable
proposition to court reformers.
Ohio and Louisiana had distinctly higher ratios of general jurisdiction judges to population
than the other states, while Tennessee, Florida, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were in a
middle group, and South Carolina had markedly fewer judges per thousand population. U.S.
DO'T OF Jus cE, NATIONAL SURVY Or COURr ORGANIZATION 257 (1973). The relative number
of judges in a state was not found to be closely correlated with the expeditious disposition of
tort cases. JudicialAdministration15, Table II. There was also the complicating factor that
the help which could be obtained from limited jurisdiction judges varied among the states,
as did the amount of time generaljurisdiction judges devoted to trying de novo cases appealed
from limited jurisdiction courts.
Finally, all the states found to be efficient were southern and primarily rural, while the
poorly performing states were northern and heavily industrialized. This distinction might be
a result of heavier caseloads, more complex cases, more use of dilatory tactics, more thorough
preparation, or use of delay to increase, as a result of inflation, the dollar value of settlements
and verdicts, all of which arguably are more prevalent in urbanized locales. A limited study
conducted in South Carolina indicates, however, that heavy caseloads alone are not detrimental to efficiency. See Institute of Judicial Administration, Preliminary Report on the Judicial
System of South Carolina 15-16, 97-98, October 1, 1971.

242
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tion of numerous remedies. 9

Since side-by-side comparison of states having similar backgrounds is therefore impracticable, a before-and-after study in
states recently altering their court structure or methods of administration offers the best means to contrast systems. Currently, the
most advocated reforms are the single-court structure, strongly advanced by the American Bar Association, 0 and the infusion of administrators into all courts, a current goal of the Chief Justice of the
United States. 2' Two states included in the original comparison
group, Florida and Ohio, fulfilled the requirements for such a study
by changing their court structures and administrative procedure
after the earlier study was made. Thus it was necessary only to
collect followup data showing time-lapses after the changes were
made to test their effectiveness.
The changes in Florida were twofold and clear cut. Beginning in
January 1972, and extending to September of that year, many Florida circuits employed trial court administrators for the first time.
These administrators, financed by LEAA funds, were concerned
primarily with the criminal process, but their activities also influenced civil case processing directly and indirectly. Because only a
portion of the circuits observed in the prior study introduced these
administrators, it was possible to make a side-by-side study in addition to a before-and-after comparison, all within the same state.
Scarcely had these administrators settled into their jobs when, on
January 1, 1973, a second change occurred, this time on a statewide
basis. Pursuant to a constitutional amendment passed March 14,
1972, and effective January 1, 1973,22 the courts were restructured
completely: the special civil and criminal courts of record were abol-

19. The largest step any state had been willing to take for experimental purposes was New

Jersey's division of cases into experimental and control groups for Professor Rosenberg's study
of the effects of the pretrial conference. M. ROSENBMRG, TIM PRn LAL CONFEREN E AND ErrcTrv Jusncs (1964). Since New Jersey already has adopted all of the frequently recommended
remedies, no controlled study seemed feasible there.
20. Among the standards relating to court organization approved in February 1974 by the
American Bar Association was the call for a single-court structure. See 57 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y
333 (1974). Pressures for the single-court structure are not confined to the United States:
despite a three-volume report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommending against
merger of the province's trial courts, Ontario's county judges continually campaign for
merger. See Toronto Star, June 15, 1974, § A, at 4, cols. 2-3.
21. Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch-1973,59 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1973).
22. FIA. CONST. art. V.
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ished,m the probate functions of the county courts were transferred
to circuit courts, 2 and the small-claims and misdemeanor functions

were consolidated in the county courts, subject to administrative
control by the circuit courts.2 While some municipal courts were
retained for a short time, they too were slated to be absorbed into
26
the county court structure.
Ohio's changes were less distinct. The first, instituted on July 1,
1970, had been authorized by a 1968 constitutional amendmentY It
was ostensibly procedural, adopting rules of civil procedure, based
on the federal model, to replace Ohio's Field Code. Ohio, however,
was not content merely to copy the federal rules. 28 It went beyond
them in two areas, jurisdiction and venue, in which the federal
advisory committees had refrained from acting. The old restrictive
venue system was changed by adopting a modem, plaintiff's-choice
venue rule. 29 Another provision was added to make the process of all
courts run throughout the state. 0 This change added nothing to the
reach of process of the general jurisdiction common pleas courts,
whose process already had statewide range, but the rule completely
eliminated the typical statutory limitations imposed on the extent
of in personam jurisdiction of the municipal 3 and county courts, 32
creating a structure in which amount in controversy represented the
only real distinction between the civil activities of the general and
limited jurisdiction courts.
Ohio's second change, created by the supreme court's Rules of
23. Id. § 20Cd).
24. Id. § 20Cc)(3).

25. Id. § 6.
26. Id. § 20(c)(4).
27. Omo CONST. art. IV, § 5.
28. For a discussion of the various departures from the federal model, see France, Rules of
CriminalProcedure:The Backgroundof Draftsmanship,23 C-v.ST. L. Ry. 32,38-44 (1974).
29. Omo R. Cirv. P. 3.The changes in concept are discussed in McCormac, Venue-"New"'
Concepts in Ohio, 39 U. CN.L. Rav. 474 (1970).
30. Omo R. Crv. P. 4.6(A).
31. Omo Ray. CoDE ANN. § 1901.19 (Page 1973) still provides:
[A] municipal court has jurisdiction within the limits of the county or counties in which its territory is situated:
(D) In any civil action or proceeding at law in which the subject matter of
the action or proceeding is located within the territory or when the defendant
or some one of the defendants resides or is served with summons within the
territory ....
32. Omo REv.CODE ANN. § 1911.012 (Page 1973) carries limitations on service substantially
identical to those of section 1901.19(D).
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Superintendence two and one-half years later, 3 also was eclectic.
Primarily, the trend toward giving court administrators power to
control calendaring and trial scheduling was reversed by making
each judge responsible for his own case processing and scheduling.
In addition, the Rules of Superintendence specified that all judges
in a multi-judge court should be allotted civil, jury, criminal, and
equity cases, thereby abolishing the criminal and equity divisions
of the courts where they had existed and moving Ohio one step
nearer to the single-court concept.
Thus each state moved, by different routes, away from the multicourt, through the two-court, and toward the single-court, system.
Florida initiated the use of nonjudicial administrators, and Ohio,
which previously had used them extensively, sharply curtailed their
use. Since the steps in each state had been taken separately, it was
possible to measure the results of each step to determine its effect
on the efficiency of case processing.
CHANGES IN OrO

ProceduralChanges
Prior to 1970 Ohio had a poor record for tort case disposition.
Much of the blame was cast on constantly amended procedure statutes, including those restricting venue. Consequently, the effective
date of the new rules of civil procedure was regarded as the begixining of a new era in which court delay would be ended. Nothing of
the sort happened, however. In fact, 1970 was a disastrous year for
civil cases, as the number of cases pending at year's end rose sharply
in most counties of the state, with particularly large increases in the
more populous metropolitan counties.34 The length of time required
to dispose of each percentage level of tort jury cases filed in that year
also increased. Six counties were used for a time study prior to the
Consensus survey. Comparison of time-lapse performance in these
counties in 1970 with their performance in 1968, also not a particularly good year, revealed that in 1970 it took four and one-half
months longer to dispose of the first 40 percent of the tort cases filed,
four and one-half months longer for the median case, and four
months longer for disposition of 80 percent of all cases. 5 The same
33. Oino Sup. R. 4 & 5.
34. See OFFICE oF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, SUPRME COUnr OF Omo, 1970 OHio
CouRT StmUiRY 11-14.
35. Time-lapse studies of the individual counties in the group are discussed in detail and
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slowdown occurred in Cincinnati, 5 Dayton, 37 and Springfield.35 Of

the 15 Ohio counties studied, only Franklin and Columbiana Counties remained relatively constant."
Significantly, there was less deterioration in the rate of disposition of criminal cases between 1967, the original study year, and the
1970 filing year in the counties studied in the original group. One
county, Mahoniing (Youngstown), improved its criminal disposition
time markedly. 0 Performance in Stark County (Canton) remained

relatively constant, 41 and in only three counties, Cuyahoga (Cleveland), Portage (Ravenna), and Summit (Akron), was there a signifi-

cant deterioration in criminal case processing time between 1967
and 1970.2 Statistical releases from the administrative director of
the Ohio supreme court also showed that the increase in number of
criminal cases pending in 1970 was much less than for civil cases.
Undoubtedly there were other reasons, besides the alteration of

the civil procedure rules, for this virtual collapse of the Ohio courts
in disposition of civil, but not criminal, cases in 1970, although they
are highly conjectural. It cannot be denied, however, that the new
civil rules had some effect. The structural changes wrought by these
rules, although arguably among the least important causal factors
for the poor 1970 showing, were among the more drastic changes in
the new system and therefore must share the responsibility to some

degree.
portrayed graphically in France, Orderin the Courts Revisited: Progressand Prospects of
ControllingDelay in the Tort Jury Litigation Process,1966-1973, 7 AKRON L. Rav. 5, 17-19
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Order in the Courts Revisited].
36. The timespan of the median tort jury case increased from 15 months in 1968 to 22
months in 1970. Id.
37. In 1968, the median case was disposed of in 19 months, while disposition of 60 percent
of the case samples took 21 months, and 70 percent took 24 months. The 1970 samples showed
time-lapses of approximately 21, 24, and 26 months for the same percentages of completion.
Id.
38. The 1968 record for Clark County (Springfield) was 20 months for 40 percent of their
tort case dispositions, two years for 50 percent, and 27 months for 60 percent. By 1970 the
same disposition percentages took 25, 30, and 31 months, respectively. Id.
39. For Franklin County (Columbus) the constant figure was approximately 24 months for
the median tort jury case. JudicialAdministration34, Table IV. Columbiana County kept a
constant 24-month disposition record for the median case while actually showing improved
time-lapses for higher percentages of dispositions. Orderin the Courts Revisited 18 n.40.
40. The disposition rate improved by two to three weeks at every measured level of dispositions. Eighty percent of the criminal cases filed were disposed of within six months in 1970.
Order in the Courts Revisited 19 n.49.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 18-19.
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Administrative and Structural Changes
The supreme court's Rules of Superintendence constituted, at
least in part, an attempt to reverse the trend illustrated by the 1970
slowdown. The rules, effective on January 1, 1972, provided for an
administrative judge empowered to assign cases among the trial
judges in multi-judge trial courts while requiring progress reports
from them on cases assigned. 4 Adoption of the individual assignment system entailed fixing responsibility on each judge to dispose
of cases assigned to him and to report on their progress." This modification was intended to transfer the responsibility of trial scheduling from the parajudicial assignment commissioners to individual
judges," thereby eliminating the administrators as traffic controllers and potential bearers of the blame for poor performance.
As with the new rules of civil procedure, there was an important
structural aspect to the Rules of Superintendence. Most Ohio multijudge courts had maintained a criminal division formally or informally, whether they used the individual judge's docket system or a
master calendar-control system. 7 All criminal defendants were arraigned before judges in the criminal division, and those judges
remained in the criminal division either for one term of court or for
43. Omo CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(1), gives the supreme court general superintendence power
over all courts in the state, enabling that court to promulgate rules of superintendence.
Section 5(B) empowers the supreme court to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure which must be filed with the clerk of each house of the General Assembly by January
15 to be effective automatically on the following July 1, unless disapproved. Id. § 5(B). An
attempt by the General Assembly to secure voter approval of a constitutional amendment
permitting the legislature to amend the rules during this interim period failed in 1973.
That the purpose of the rules was to reduce serious delay problems was evidenced by the
statement in rule 1(A):
Delay in both criminal and civil cases in the trial courts of Ohio is presently
the most serious problem in the administration of justice in this state. It is to
be remembered that the courts are created not for the convenience or benefit of
the judges and lawyers, but to serve the litigants and the interests of the public
at large. When cases are unnecessarily delayed, the confidence of all people in
the judicial system suffers. The confidence of the people in the ability of our
system of government to achieve liberty and justice under law for all is the
foundation upon which the American system of government is built.
Oto Sup. R. I(A).
44. Omo Sup. R. 3.
45. Omo Sup. R. 4.
46. Formerly, most of Ohio's multi-judge courts had operated assignment commissioner's
offices responsible to the collective bench through the presiding judge.
47. For a discussion of different calendar-control systems, see JudicialAdministration2936.
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a year at a time. All preliminary matters were heard before them,

and usually the cases were tried before them, instead of before other
judges although, where the individual judge's docket system prevailed, the cases sometimes were tried before a particular judge even
after he had been transferred to another division of the court. Similarly, a few courts informally had established a civil nonjury or

equity division in which specified judges sat regularly in all equity,
prerogative writ, and other nonjury matters. This system, using

judges' expertise or preference to advantage, was eliminated by the
new rules. 5 Only one division of a multi-judge court would be recognized for all types of'case assignment and disposition, with each
judge assigned approximately an equal number of cases in each
category. This portion of the rules dealt not with administration,
but with a purely structural change precluding subsequent recognition of judicial preference or expertise. 9 This went far beyond

Pound's 0 or Vanderbilt's 5' concept of the single court, returning to
a system of equal opportunity and demand for performance with
total interchangeability of judicial machinery.
To these two modifications, one administrative and one structural, a third, the "norm," was added, apparently to provide a measure of performance. Each type of case in the general division was
given a norm for disposition by Report Form A. Eminent domain
and criminal cases had norms of six months; workmen's compensa48. See note 45 supra & accompanying text. Rule 4, as part of the individual assignment
system, provides that cases, immediately upon filing, are to be assigned by lot to the judges
of a multi-judge division. The assignment system went into effect on January 1, 1972, when
each judge was required to report an inventory of cases pending. The first reports on the
disposition of cases were due February 15, 1972, with reports on case disposition due monthly
thereafter. See OHIo Sup. R.4 & 5; Ohio Supreme Court Report Form A.
49. This aspect of the rules did not pass unchallenged by the Ohio General Assembly.
While the Rules of Superintendence abolished the criminal and equity divisions created by
local court rules, they did preserve the probate and domestic relations divisions previously
created by statute. When the General Assembly amended the judicial article of the Ohio
Constitution in 1973, it was careful to insert that the trial court could act by "a probate
division and such other divisions... as may be provided by law," thereby ensuring its ability
to create such divisions of the trial courts as it, not the supreme court, should deem necessary.
OMo CoNsT. art. IV, § 4(c).
50. Pound proposed that the trial court should have as many specialized divisions as
necessary. See R. POUND.ORGANZATION OF Cou'RS 277-80 (1940).
51. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of New Jersey never conceded that a
single trial court was the answer. Rather, he advocated a local court of limited jurisdiction
in addition to a trial court of general statewide jurisdiction. Vanderbilt, The Essentialsof a
Sound JudicialSystem, 48 Nw. U.L. Ray. 1, 2 (1953).
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tion cases, an unusual form of administrative appeal, 5 were given
a norm of one year; personal injury cases had a norm of two years;
all other civil cases had an 18-month norm. 3 The continued listing
of any case on a judge's docket for longer than its norm presumably
indicated a need to explain why he had not disposed of it.
The relative differences in these time allowances, as well as their
absolute periods, raised some question of priorities. Obviously the
time allowance of six months for criminal cases was proper, both
absolutely and in relation to other classifications. The rationale of
providing different norms for eminent domain and workmen's compensation, however, was not apparent so readily; nor was the unequal treatment of personal injury and other tort cases easily understandable. The intended effect of these differences on judicial priorities when scheduling the court calendar also was not clear, since a
logical reaction might be to give preference to those cases in each
category which were approaching their deadlines, causing possible
distortion of the priority system to improve the judge's performance
within the alloted time.
First reports after the effective date of the Rules of Superintendence did not give a clear indication of their effectiveness in expediting case disposition. Through the first year, the reports largely
praised those judges who had "terminated"54 more than a specific
number of cases, presumably another norm determined with reference to the average number of cases previously terminated by the
judges on that particular bench or by all judges in the state. Judges
who exceeded a certain number of dispositions received awards, but
because these terminations were not related to the number of cases
assigned to that particular judge, his effectiveness in case management could not be determined.5 Inasmuch as terminations were not
52. In Ohio, although the appeal from the Industrial Commission to the court is in the form
of an administrative appeal, the single question of one's right to participate in the workmen's
compensation fund to the extent found by the Commission is decided by the court or by a
jury if demanded. OMo REV. CODE ANm. § 4123.519 (Page 1973).
53. Address by Chief Justice C. William O'Neill, Ohio State BarAssociation Annual Meeting, May 10, 1973, in 46 Omo B. 755, 756 (1973).
54. The word "terminated," as used by the Rules of Superintendence, does not correspond
in meaning with the former term "disposed of." Cases transferred to other courts or to other
judges of the same court for disposition and criminal cases in which the defendant has
escaped or jumped bail after arraignment are all considered "terminated," but they were not
"disposed of." See Order in the Courts Revisited 21-22.
55. This lack of correlation between terminations and backlog reduction was conceded by
Ohio's chief justice. Address by Chief Justice C. William O'Neill, Ohio State Bar Association
Annual Meeting, May 10, 1973, in 46 Omo B. 755, 763-64 (1973).
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.cla:gsified according to criminal and civil matters or among the various types of civil cases, the types of cases or norms given priority
-also could not be discerned. Meanwhile, the administrative director
of the supreme court abruptly suspended publication of monthly
filing and termination reports for the trial courts for a full year.
After the beginning of 1973, through speeches and the press, some
data-became available concerning filings in relation to terminations
and gain or loss in case backlog; still there was no breakdown of
dispositions by types of cases and no way to determine whether the
civil and criminal proportions of the total backlog had changed. In
addition because there were significant changes in the accounting
system involving determination of the date when a case should be
considered pending" or terminated,57 the figures for 1972 could not
be compared realistically with previously published statistics.
The 1972 annual courts summary by the administrative director,
not released until May 1973, also was disappointing. While it
showed the total number of cases filed in each of an increased number of categories, it recorded only subtotals of cases disposed of by
various modes. Mere addition of the subtotals involved risk since all
modes of disposition might not have been included in the summary.
At face value, the report showed a statewide reduction of 2,300 cases
in the total number pending at the end of the year." Personal injury
case pendency was reduced by 3,837 cases, while the number of
criminal cases pending increased by 2,597. This result was shocking
in light of the high priority given to criminal cases under the Rules
of Superintendence. The risk of assuming that the 1972 summary's
various subtotals included all modes of disposition or termination,
however, materialized since a substantial number of cases, the majority of which were criminal, apparently had been disposed of but
not reported in the summary. Since the reporting error, never corrected, approximately equaled the apparent increase in the number
56. A criminal case formerly was considered pending from the time a committing magistrate certified for grand jury indictment his record finding probable cause, but under the
Rules of Superintendence, a defendant's case is not pending, even after indictment, until
the "date of arraignment on the indictment or information." Omo SuP. R. 5; Ohio Supreme
Court Report Form A.
57. See note 54 supra.
58. The questionable accuracy of the report was emphasized by a simultaneous proclamation by the state's chief justice that the number of cases pending at year's end had been
reduced by more than 9,000. See Address by Chief Justice C. William O'Neill, Ohio State
Bar Association Annual Meeting, May 10, 1973, in 46 Oto B. 755 (1973).
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of pending criminal cases reported, Ohio in fact had not lost ground
in its criminal case dispositions, while it had reduced the number
of pending personal injury cases by almost 4,000.
This report did not indicate, however, whether there had been any
reduction in the disposition time of the typical, median, or average
tort jury case with which the earlier comparative study had been
concerned. During the 1966 and 1968 studies an approximate 1:1
ratio had been established between the time taken for disposition
of the median tort jury case and "statistical dela'y," the latter
measurement being the quotient of all pending civil cases divided
by the average monthly disposition of all such cases. 9 In the 1970
disaster year this ratio had been altered drastically," and there was
no assurance that it had been restored by 1972.1 Actual measurement of 1971-filed cases, by sample, was the only alternative to
reliance on the unamended and obviously misleading totals of the
1972 annual summary. In addition actual measurement of 1972
samples was required to determine whether or not, after this year
of drastic change, the former 1:1 ratio would be reattained. Actual
measurement of these timespans for both years was commenced at
approximately the same time the 1972 summary figures were released; measurements for the 1972 and new 1973 samples were continued for'a full year. The composite, or unweighted average, of
times taken to reach various percentages of disposition, through
April 1974, is shown in Table I for the six-county study area.
The decrease in disposition time after filing year 1970 was substantial, but generally less than the increase between 1968 and 1970;
in the six-county area, at least, the courts had not made up the
losses of the disaster year. In other counties the results varied. In
Clark County (Springfield), despite some impressive early gains,
only 27 percent of dispositions were recorded by 17 months after
59. "The quotient of pending cases, or backlog divided by average monthly dispositions,
is sometimes referred to as 'statistical delay,' or the number of months it would theoretically
take to reach the last pending case, if all cases were disposed of in order of filing." Orderin
the Courts Revisited 19. "The calculated measurements, or statistical delay . . . is from
arrest, not from indictment, to final disposition, or sentence, not the date of trial or plea."
Id. at 19 n.50.
60. For both the 1966 and 1968 filingyears, the measured time for disposition of the median
case was 90 percent of the statistical delay. For the filing year of 1970, it was 150 percent of
statistical delay.
61. A comparison made after the 1973 figures were released and measurements completed
through the 26th month after filing showed statistical delay for the 1972 filings to be 127
percent of the measured median.
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TABLE I
MONTHS REQUIRED To DisposE OF VAIuOs PERCENTAGES OF
ToRT JURY (PERSONAL INJny) CASES BY FnILIG YEAR

Filing
Year

10%

20%

1966
1968

4.0
2.8

6.3
7.0

30%
10.3
10.2

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

14.1
14.2

17.0
17.1

22.1
20.8

25.7
26.0

29.2

26.0

30.7

Rules of Civil Procedure (1970)
1968
1970
1971

4.0
4.7

10.3
9.7

15.3

18.6

21.6

Rules of Superintendence (1972)
21.6

25.0

28.7

35.0

9.7

11.2

15.5

19.0

20.7

25.0

27.9

18.0

20.9

23.3

1970

1971
1972

3.5

7.2

11.4

15.0

1973

5.3

11.0

13.1+

15.0

filing for both 1972 and 1970 filings. In Cincinnati, as in the composite group, the reduction since 1970 was substantial (six months for
the median case) but less than the loss from 1968 (eight months for
the median case). In Dayton and Columbus, the 1972 cases moved
substantially faster than both the 1970 and 1968 case groups. 2
It was not surprising that efficiency improved less on a measured
than on a purely numerical basis. Any change in the reporting of
case assignments might reveal a quantity of cases still technically
pending which had long been regarded as completed. Many of the
cases disposed of by the 1972 changeover "inventory" undoubtedly
were in this category: cases old enough not to have been included
in the samples drawn for measurement in prior years, whose disposition, probably by penstroke alone, would not be reflected in the
measurement, although their presence or absence on the pending
list would affect the age of the "average" pending case.
After the "inventory" and "housecleaning" effects63 of the system

change were exhausted, disposition thime continued to improve. The
62. In Dayton, studies completed in December 1973 showed that the 1972 sample median
ease was disposed of in less than 16 months, compared with 19 months for the 1968 sample
median and nearly 22 months for the 1970 median. In Columbus, the 1972 median case was
disposed of in 15.5 months, compared with 24 months in the 1966, 1968, and 1970 sample
median cases.
63. "Housecleaning" effects included those resulting from such factors as the rule requiring
dismissal of cases that remained inactive for six months. See Order in the Courts Revisited
23-24.
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samples of early 1973 filings in all six counties over a period of 14
months showed dispositions almost equal to the 1971 and 1972 standards for that period of pendency. Meanwhile, the 1973 annual summary, this time with complete totals, again evidenced a smaller but
still impressive backlog reduction in all categories, including the
personal injury classification, which corresponded closely to the
cases selected for the tort jury trial measurements. Clearly there was
housecleaning, which would not be reflected in the time measurements, still going on in some of the counties. Other counties, however, notably Summit and Mahoning, had exhausted almost all of
their long-forgotten tort cases, and their statistical gains were reflected in greatly increased disposition percentages at the 14-month
level. In others, notably Trumbull and Medina Counties, the disposition rate for both 1973 and 1972 samples declined, and the calculated and measured median time for case disposition approached
the former 1:1 ratio. The first year of progress of the 1973 samples
indicated that these cases were, in fact, taking longer for the first
10 and 20 percent of case dispositions than the 1972, 1970, 1968, and
1966 cases, as Table I reveals. Meanwhile the rate of progress of the
1972 cases, after a faster start due to the new system, was not noticeably greater than for 1970 cases, and cumulative dispositions by the
20th month of pendency were still below the 1968 level. Early in
1974 it appeared that the effectiveness of the Rules of Superintendence in promoting faster disposition time had decreased.
By April 1974, however, when the 1973 summary appeared, showing continued reduction of cases pending in all categories, the rate
of progress for tort jury case dispositions advanced substantially in
both the 1972 and 1973 filing year samples. For the first time, the
cumulative disposition rate for 1972 cases rose above the 1968 rate
for the same period of time, showing 70 percent of all cases disposed
of in 23 months. Meanwhile the 1973 cumulative dispositions rose
to 36 percent in 14 months of processing and to 48 percent in 18
months.
Total Effect
It is difficult to determine how much of the lost efficiency between
1968 and 1970 resulted from the changed court procedure and how
much was due to the incidental change in court structure."4 Un64. See notes 34-42 supra & accompanying text.
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doubtedly, more should be attributed, at least initially, to the
purely procedural change. Civil case filings increased greatly in 1970
when the new rules of procedure became effective, partially as a
result of litigation saved for filing under the new system. This great
mass of new litigation affected not only the pendency statistics but
also the ability of judges to process cases with which the bar was
testing the new rules. There is some indication that by the latter
part of 1971 the courts were overcoming this major setback. 5
It is clear 'that more credit for improvements after the 1972
changes should be given to the new administrative functions of
judges than to the abolition of the separate criminal and equity
divisions. The divisions had been abolished and varying norms for
disposition of case types established for the obvious purpose of
moving criminal cases faster at the expense of personal injury and
other cases, but this result was not achieved. There was no substantial reduction in the elapsed time for disposition of criminal cases,
although a significant reduction for the disfavored cases occurred.
It seems unlikely that changes favoring criminal rather than civil
cases would be so unsuccessful that they would cause the latter to
gain at the expense of the former. Therefore, it would appear that
most of the gain should be attirbuted to the substitution of judges
for court administrators as case-flow managers. Indeed, the improvement might have been greater, and may have extended to the
criminal field, had the rules continued to make use of expertise of
judges sitting in specialized divisions, thereby also avoiding increased scheduling conflicts for the trial bar.6 The wisdom of judicial case-flow management thus has been illustrated by the total
changes between filing years.
Of equal importance were the trends in disposition rates of the
various filing years. In 1968, the pre-change base year for comparison, the progress line for the six Ohio counties studied was relatively
straight, indicating a constant disposition rate from month to
month. In 1970, dispositions slowed down in the early months after
filing, followed by a slightly higher rate after the first 18 months of
65. The rate of disposition for the 1970 cases began to rise in March 1971. By May 1971,
the rate actually exceeded that for the comparable period of 1968 cases. Because of poor
progress in 1970, however, cumulative production still was almost five months behind the
1968 performance. See Table II.
66. For a discussion of the scheduling difficulties produced by use of the unrestricted
individual judge's docket, see JudicialAdministration 34-36.
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pendency. Total productivity for the 1970 samples, however, did not
surpass the 1968 standard until more than three years after filing,
more than one year after the adoption of the Rules of Superintendence. This early deceleration reappeared in the disposition of the
1971 samples, with total production equaling the 1968 total 21
months after filing, but not exceeding it appreciably for some time
thereafter. In 1972, the initial rate was slightly higher, undoubtedly
as a result of the implementation of the Rules of Superintendence;
total production again equaled the 1968 standard by 21 months after
filing and greatly exceeded it after two years from the filing date.
The 1973 filings exhibited the same slow pace in the early stages as
in the 1970 and 1971 samples, but the rate increased markedly after
the first year of pendency. Although this general trend was not
apparent in each county studied, the overall effect significantly indicates that less concern was being given to early disposition in the
later years and that only as the two-year time standard of the rulesimposed "norm" was approached was any emphasis placed on settlement of cases still pending. Variations in progress rates are shown
in Table II.
Even after several attempts to expedite case processing, Ohio has
not progressed much beyond its earlier low standing, compared to
its sister states,67 in the elimination of litigation delay. In 1974 its
tort jury cases are moving almost as slowly as in 1968-69. The Ohio
General Assembly, relatively quiescent in creating new judgeships
during the change years of the early 1970's, apparently does not
share the confidence of the state's chief justice that changes in
judicial machinery and administration alone can establish the state
as a leader in speedy justice. In 1973, the legislature proposed
changes, subsequently ratified by the voters, in the constitution's
five-year-old judicial article authorizing the legislative creation of
a single-court system by turning the limited jurisdiction courts into
divisions of the general jurisdiction Common Pleas courts. 8 The
salaries of many of the limited jurisdiction judges were raised almost to the level of the general jurisdiction judges' salaries.69 Reducing the distinctions between these two types of judges indirectly
67. See id. at 15, Table H.
68. See Omo CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
69. See Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1901.11 (Page 1973) (effective Nov. 16, 1973). The constitutional amendment also removed the previously existing ban on "in-term" salary raises for
limited jurisdiction judges. Omo CoNSI. art. IV, § 6.
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indicates a lack of confidence in the prior procedural, structural,
and administrative reforms; the legislature's activity in other areas
has emphasized that lack of confidence more directly. The state
inched closer to no-fault automobile insurance0 to reduce the tort
caseload. The legislature also doubled the maximum monetary jurisdiction of the municipal courts, 71 and it enacted a no-fault divorce
statute72to ease the disposition of the steadily increasing number of
domestic relations cases on the general jurisdiction docket.
Despite these changes to reduce the volume and difficulty of the
general jurisdiction caseload, and notwithstanding the chief justice's pronouncements that Ohio was winning the battle with court
delay, the General Assembly, in June 1974, considered proposals to
increase drastically the number of judges, primarily in the metropolitan counties. 3 These additional judgeships were to be concentrated not in the separate domestic relations divisions, in which
filings have increased by over 25 percent in the last 10 years, but in
the general divisions, where there had been only a three percent
increase in the number of personal injury cases over the same period
and where the ultimate effect of no-fault insurance and of increased
monetary jurisdiction of the municipal courts would be a reduction
in cases filed. This indication of legislative intent to create additional judgeships to handle general docket civil matters74 does not
lend credence to predictions that Ohio can become a leader in eliminating court delay with existing court resources. 75
70. The problems of reconciling lawyer-legislators in the Ohio House of Representatives to
a reasonable "threshold" for tort suits prevented the enactment of a no-fault statute during
the 1974 session. A Senate committee restored drastic cuts made in the threshold amount,
but the bill languished in the Rules Committee and did not reach the Senate floor.
71. Omo Rav. CODE ANN.§ 1901.17 (Page Legis. Bull. 1, 1974), amending Omo Rnv. CODE

ANN.§ 1901.17 (Page 1973), set the new maximum limit of $10,000. The previous limit in most
of these courts had been $5,000.
72. OHo Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.61-65 (Page Legis. Bull. 3, 1974) (effective Sept. 23,

1974).
73. Substituted H.B. 1153, Ohio General Assembly (1973-74), which would have increased
the number of general jurisdiction judges by 19, a 10 percent increase statewide, was defeated
on the floor. It later passed the House, but died in the Senate.
74. Some legiSlators, however, frankly acknowledged that the purpose of the proposals
was not solely to create additional judgeships. The positions, some in areas where they were
both unneeded and unwanted, were offered to induce House members to vote for a provision
in an omnibus court bill that would have abolished the judicial functions of Ohio's mayors.
When the latter provision was stricken, the bill failed to pass.
75. See note 89 infra & accompanying text.
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CHANGES IN FLORIDA

Trial Court Administration
The purposes of Florida's changes, unlike those in Ohio, were
clear, without hidden objectives or inadvertent effects. The first
change, administrative in nature, was tentative and optional for the
circuits. Initially, a professionally trained state court administrator
was obtained, and a staff assembled to receive and act upon operations reports from the intermediate appellate and trial courts; previously the loosely organized Judicial Council staff only had collected statistics. Thereafter, the circuit courts were encouraged by
available LEAA grants to employ local trial court administrators or
executives. Although their duties and range of authority were not
rigidly specified, it was assumed in view of the source of the grants
that these administrators would be concerned primarily with organization of the criminal docket.
The employment of court executives began in southern Florida
(Dade County) in early 1972, spreading northward, through Orange
County (Orlando) by April, and reaching north Florida (Jacksonville) by June of that year. Other courts followed, and by the end
of 1972, only four circuits were without such administrative assistance. Of the counties originally subjected to time-lapse measurement, three, Marion, Lake, and Pinellas, were in circuits that did
not acquire administrators during the year. Since no precise scope
of duties was established for the new administrators beyond the
requirements to submit intelligible data to the state administrator's
office and to concentrate their efforts in the criminal case field, their
general field of activity varied with their backgrounds, their susceptibility to suggestion from the state administrator's office, and the
concerns of the chief judge of the circuit to whom each administrator was directly responsible. The background of the administrators
varied; among them were former newspapermen, deputy court
clerks, law librarians, and one practicing trial attorney.76
A.

Initial Studies
The before-and-after studies of both administration and structure

76. The attorney was employed despite a clear preference of the training organization, the
Institute for Court Management, for individuals who would be unlikely to use the administrative position as preparation for seeking election as a judge. Statement by the then Director
of the Institute for Court Management to Jacksonville Bar Association advisory committee

for the Duval County Circuit Court, August 1972.
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centered initially on the north and central Florida counties where
the direct time studies for the seven-state comparison had been
made: Duval (Jacksonville), Alachua (Gainesville), Marion
(Ocala), Orange (Orlando), and Lake (Tavares). Later, St. Johns
County was added as a replacement for Volusia County (DaytonaDeLand) because of difficulties in obtaining reliable measurements
from Volusia County's virtually nonexistent docket monitoring system. Studies were postponed in Pinellas (Clearwater-St. Petersburg), Hillsborough (Tampa), Dade (Miami), and Broward (Fort
Lauderdale) Counties because most of the pre-1971 statistics in
those counties had not been calculated from direct docket-sample
measurement.77 Greater accuracy of actual measurement was

needed for a before-and-after study.
Two of the six counties studied initially, Orange and St. Johns,
had administrators involved in civil case processing; two, Duval and
Alachua, had administrators who for different reasons 8 did not concern themselves with this field; two, Marion and Lake, had no administrators and therefore could be used as controls. In the early
stages of case processing, heavily administered Orange County produced a slightly better record in 1972, after administration commenced, than in 1970. In later stages, however, it took longer to
achieve the same percentage of case dispositions.7 9 In smaller, but
also heavily administered, St. Johns County, the time advantage
was clearly greater for the court in its last unadministered year,
1971, than in 1972.80

The results were less clear where the administrators were less
involved in civil case processing. In Duval County, the time-in77. Pinellas, Dade, and Hillsborough Counties had been included in the composite Florida
progress graph line (See JudicialAdministration 15, Table 11), but only Pinellas had been
subjected to docket-sample measurement. The other two counties' records had been calculated from figures published by the Institute of Judicial Administration. For a consideration
of the limitations on these latter figures, see id. at 10.
78. The Duval County executive, the county's former chief trial counsel, was well aware
of the court's outstanding performance record and made no attempt to improve upon it. The
Alachua County executive, a former newsman without legal training, admitted to the author
that he knew too little about the civil litigation process to suggest any calendaring changes.
79. While final results, at 90 percent of cumulative dispositions, showed virtually identical
timespans, the 1972 disposition rates between the 20th and 60th percentiles were one to two

months faster than in 1970.
80. Because of the small volume of cases and the resulting small samples, the swings in
elapsed time from year to year were extreme. The years 1969 and 1971 showed that 75 percent
of all tort cases were disposed of within seven months. The same disposition percentage took
nearly a year for 1972 cases and more than two years for cases filed in 1970.

19741

CONSENSUS REVISITED

process between 1970 and 1972 increased by one month for 40 percent of dispositions and by four and one-half months at the 90 perpercent level. By contrast, in Alachua County there was improvement at the earlier disposition levels of the 1972 cases of from 1.4
to 3.0 months over 1970 dispositions at the median disposition level;
thereafter, the disposition rate for the 1972 cases fell off rapidly. '
Results in the counties without any parajudicial administration
were mixed. Efficiency declined in Lake County between 1970 and
1972 by one to two and one-half months through the 60 percent
disposition level, but an improvement of from one to six months
through the 70 percent level for the same years occurred in Marion

County.
This sparse data indicates that the presence of concerned and
active administrators cannot assure rapid disposition of civil cases
and that less active administrators may restrain disposition much
less. Although other extraneous factors caused the results in unadministered counties to vary greatly, improvement of case flow
seemed more likely without administrators, further indicating an
inverse correlation between the use of nonjudicial administration
and efficient case processing.
B.

Later Studies

Serious difficulties subsequently developed with the use of the
counties initially selected as typical of Florida's experience. St.
Johns County, substituted for Volusia County, had too few tort
cases for reliable measurement; Lake County seemed atypical for
other reasons82 and therefore was not used. Other counties experiencing more characteristic case processing and calendar control
problems were substituted: Pinellas County (St. Petersburg), which
had been used in the 1970 study but which had not been measured
since; Hillsborough (Tampa) and Dade (Miami) Counties, both of
which had been used on a calculated basis for the 1970 study; and
Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), an example of the fast-growing
81. The 1972 rate in this county was slightly better than the 1968 and 1970 rates up to the
60th percentile (eight months), but it took 21 months to secure 80 percent dispositions compared with less than 20 months for the same level of dispositions for 1968 and 1970 cases.
82. Although the twelfth largest county in the state, Lake County had no city of moderate
size to generate legal business; also its court operations had been disrupted by a prisoner
mistreatment charge against the county sheriff, and the only resident circuit judge had
suffered a disabling heart attack.
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east coast counties in southern Florida. Eight of the state's fourteen
largest counties were represented in the later study, evenly balanced
between south, central, and north Florida. Of the eight, four had
instituted inclusive trial court administration soon after authorization; two, both in north Florida, had administrators who refrained
from managing the civil docket; the remaining two elected to have
no nonjudicial administration.
The results of time-lapse studies carried on in this large group of
more representative counties over a longer time period varied somewhat from those of the earlier studies. In both Dade and Hillsborough Counties, which were fully administered, the timespans for
tort jury case disposition lengthened measurably for 1972 compared
with 1970.3 In Broward County, after some initial improvement in
the earlier stages in 1972, the progress lines for the two years were
virtually identical.u A composite progress chart for the two years
shows that the four fully administered counties (Dade, Broward,
Hillsborough, and Orange) actually lost ground in 1972, their first
year of administration. The partially administered counties (Duval
and Alachua), whose administrators did not participate in civil case
processing or scheduling, maintained their 1970 pace until the 70
percent disposition level, then lost some ground. The unadministered courts in Pinellas and Marion Counties, after virtually identical progress in disposing of their median cases, showed measurable
improvement over 1970 performance at the higher disposition levels.
Table II illustrates the comparative composite progress of the Florida counties studied. Although the great improvement of the unadministered courts was due largely to Marion County's unimpressive
record for its 1970 filings, the presence or absence of a trial court
administrator was nevertheless the sole distinguishing feature between counties during the years observed. Structural change had
some influence on the improved showing by some courts in the
following year.
83. In Dade County, through the 40th percentile of tort case dispositions, the time-lapses
were negligibly shorter for 1972 cases than for the 1970 filings; thereafter it took measurably
longer to reach each level of disposition. In Hillsborough County, the 1972 timespans at every
level above 20 percent were one to two months longer than for 1970.
84. The 1972 cases took less time for disposition than the 1970 cases for levels below the
60th percentile; thereafter the 1972 progress line was indistinguishable from the 1970 line.
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Structural Changes
Because there were no control groups or partial changes in the
structural field, the time-lapse changes caused by the 1973 constitutional amendments8 5 were relatively easy to assess. Of the six counties first studied, all but one (Marion) had increased their timespans for tort case dispositions at every measured percentile of dispositions from 1972 to 1973. A comparison with the 1970 record,
additionally influenced by administrative changes, showed mixed
results, with three of the six counties taking a considerably longer
time, two taking a shorter time, and one approximately the same
time, for disposition of cases at every level. The results on a composite or unweighted average basis for all six counties were as follows:
MONTHS-REQUIRED OR DisosrrioN OF VAous
PERcENTAGEs oF TORT JURY CASES

Filing Year

20% 30%

40%

50% 60%

70%

1970 (no trial court
administration)
1972 (partial
administration)
1973 (new structure)

4.0

5.2

6.8

8.4

10.4

16.0

3.9

5.9

6.5

8.5

10.6

13.4+

4.9

7.0

8.5

9.7

Not reached

Not reached

When the longer measurement period for the revised group of
more populous counties was observed, the evaluation of progress
from 1972 to 1973 changed appreciably. The timespan for disposition lengthened slightly in three counties (Duval, Pinellas, and Orange), remained relatively constant in one (Broward), and improved
significantly in the remaining four. Trial court administrators might
have claimed that the improvement was merely a delayed effect of
their efforts in the previous year; there was both progress and deterioration, however, in counties with each degree of administration.
Moreover, Broward County, one of the first fully administered counties, had virtually identical performance in each year. Administrative factors therefore seemed to have little effect on these composite
figures.
The comparative time for disposition of tort jury cases by all eight
Florida counties showed surprising differences from the original six
counties studied. The months required for various percentages of
tort case disposition for 1972 and 1973 evidence the overall effect:
85. See notes 22-26 supra & accompanying text.
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20%

30% 40%

4.5
3.8

6.0
5.5

7.5
7.5

50%

60%

70%

9.0
8.6

10.6
9.9

13.0
Not reached

While the earlier Florida study mirrored Ohio's experience that a
structural change may be accompanied by a temporary loss of efficiency during an adjustment period, the results from the larger
group of more populous counties did not support this conclusion.
Florida's circuit judges responded favorably to their additional
tasks: 8 there was a significant gain at nearly every level of tort case
disposition. This improvement does not necessarily demonstrate the
superiority of the single-court system, for Florida has not adopted
the concept, but it does illustrate the success of a well-planned
approach to the single-court structure, while also showing that the
assumption of additional administrative duties by judges does not
necessarily slow case disposition.
Total Effect
The combined effect of Florida's changes was distinctly for the
better. Efficiency lost before 1972 in the fully administered counties
was more than recouped in 1973 with the new structure. In the entire
group of counties, the timespan for case processing did not lengthen
appreciably between 1970 and 1973; at every percentage level except
one the timespan decreased. Only occasionally did longer spans
appear, and these were only for limited periods. Perhaps foremost
was the absence of drastic fluctuations in disposition rate that had
been observed in Ohio, as indicated by the greater disparity among
the yearly progress lines for Ohio as compared to those for Florida
in Table IV. Ohio's abandonment of nonjudicial case processing'had
produced an almost instant improvement in disposition time; the
introduction of court executives in Florida, however, did not produce the expected sharp loss of efficiency.8
86. These judges absorbed the county court judges' probate functions, supervised the new
county courts, and in some cases, with the help of additional judges, replaced the old criminal
courts of record. See notes 22-26 supra & accompanying text.
87. Certainly, the unwillingness of some counties to use executives at all, as well as the
reluctance of some administrators to participate in civil case processing, aided this result.
Nonparticipation in civil matters seemingly is inconsistent with at least some job descriptions
for the position; the Ninth Judicial Circuit executive's tasks, for example, include the development of an administrative plan for 75 percent utilization of courtrooms and the duty "to
manage the new Circuit Court." See National Center for State Courts, Court Improvement
Programs 15, November 1972.
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Similarly, Ohio's experience in 1970 might have foreshadowed a
complete collapse of civil case processing in Florida due to the 1972
structural changes. Surprisingly, however, there was a slight but
noticeable improvement in the disposition rate. A possible explanation for this difference is that Florida's structural changes, though
at least as substantial as Ohio's, were well advertised and prepared
for by those concerned, while in Ohio the effort to achieve structural
change was indirect and by dubiously constitutional sleight of
8
hand.1
In one respect the reactions in the two states were alike. After the
changes had been in effect for a full year, Ohio's chief justice predicted in 1973 an era in which his state would lead the nation in
speedy justice. 9 A year later Florida's chief justice similarly contrasted achievements in the first year after the structural change
with the system's previous decrepitude." The two statements were
equally wide of the mark, but for different reasons. Ohio cannot
expect overwhelming improvement upon its present and past poor
record for tort case disposition. Florida, however, had been a leader
in tort jury case processing long before the administrative and structural changes extolled by its chief justice. Its progress since 1970,
while discernible, was slight, and the Chief Justice gave too little
credit to the prior achievements of his trial judges.
CONCLUSION

This double before-and-after study, with some degree of control
of other variables, tested two conclusions reached in the seven-state
study of 1970-72: that unrestricted.use of parajudicial administrators for case processing inhibits efficient disposition of tort jury
cases, and that the single trial court structure is not the most efficient for disposing of tort jury cases. The other original conclusions
were ignored where possible to avoid too wide a spectrum of determinations based on the same data and to avoid any question of
regional superiorities, an unintended result of the prior study. The
followup study supported earlier impressions of the use of parajudicial case processors, while conclusions concerning modified court
88. For another possible cause of differing results in Florida and Ohio concerning ease of
transition, see note 96 infra & accompanying text.
89. Address by Chief Justice C. William O'Neill, Ohio State Bar Association Annual Meeting, May 10, 1973, in 46 Oiuo B. 755, 766 (1973).
90. See Florida Times-Union, Mar. 22, 1974, § A, at 14, cola. 3-4.
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structure could not be drawn so easily; additionally, some incidental
conclusions supplemented the results.
The evidence, both direct and indirect, clearly illustrated the
detrimental effects of using parajudicial administrators: in varying
degrees, Florida experiments indicated that efficiency varied inversely with the extent of civil case processing by administrators;
when Ohio abandoned the use of administrators in case processing
as far as possible, a noticeable increase in efficiency resulted immediately. Ohio's rate of progress decreased slightly after the first year
of change and after the "inventory" and "housecleaning" effects
subsided, but in early 1974 Ohio finally surpassed the progress rate
of its pre-change base year, 1968. Even if it does not become a leader
in efficiency, Ohio can expect some improvement if judges, not
administrators, retain responsibility for case processing.
It does not follow that court administrators necessarily hinder
efficiency, since they may be very useful in many of the primarily
business-oriented court tasks, such as budgeting and personnel
management. The virtue of their use in case processing and trial
scheduling simply has been oversold. Court administrators should
not perform tasks that call for professionals in the litigation process.
In the important area of the pretrial conference an experienced
administrator might perform efficiently. Such a master also might
dovetail the list of trials to take place on any given day, but only if
he has the complete backing of his judges. Such support may be
difficult to obtain since an attorney frequently will go behind the
ad:inistrator's back to the judge to frustrate a well-planned trial
schedule with an ill-timed continuance or adjournment. Far too
many state court judges, dependent upon the good will of the litigation bar, may capitulate, creating a source of disruption that may
explain the general lack of success of both lay and professional case
processing..
There is also a secondary conclusion concerning court administration. The hypothesis that judges would be more efficient case processors if relieved of other administrative duties was refuted to some
extent by the Florida results. In 1973 the chief judges of the Florida
circuits were given responsibility for administrative supervision of
the new county courts91 as well as for integration of the caseloads
and new judges into their own courts. Despite this rather awesome
91. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(d).
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and essentially nondelegable responsibility, they performed admira-

bly, increasing the productivity of their own courts as well. If such
increased duties can improve performance, it seems unlikely that
reduced burdens would have a similar effect.
On the other hand, no clear conclusions could be drawn to support
the prior evaluation of the single-court concept. Neither Ohio nor
Florida went forthrightly to this framework, as both changes were
only preparatory, and Ohio's was quite indirect. 2 Thus no indica-

tion can be taken from this study that institution of a single trial
court will improve tort jury case processing, leaving uncontradicted

the original side-by-side study's finding " that, as illustrated by
Pennsylvania and Louisiana, a single-court structure is less efficient
than a multiple-court system.
An incidental conclusion can be stated regarding the benefits of
increased numbers of judges. Ohio's General Assembly apparently
felt at the outset that efficient court operation could be achieved
without a large number of additional judges. Few additional judge-

ships were created between 1969 and 1974, although rather large
salary increases were provided. 4 By the time the legislature attempted to increase judicial manpower, 5 the other reforms were
complete. In contrast, Florida's administrative and structural
changes were accompanied by the creation of more judgeships."

This added supply of judges during the critical months of transition
may explain why Florida adopted its modifications more smoothly
than Ohio.
92. Staff notes to rule 4.6(A) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure indicate thatno consideration was given to the problem of statutory limitations on the exercise of in personamjurisdiction by municipal and county courts. Staff Note, Omo R. Civ. P. 4.6(A). The constitutional
amendment creating new divisions of the court was passed under a description, issued by the
Secretary of State, which emphasized creation of multi-county general jurisdiction court
districts and equalization of judges' pay.

93. See JudicialAdministration16.
94. See Omio REv. Cons ANN.§§ 1901.11, 1907.081 (Page 1973).
95. See note 73 supra & accompanying text.
96. A former judicial article (FLA. Co0sT. art.V, § 6(1956)) had tied the number of judges
to the population, computed by the decennial federal census, which increased in 1970. New
openings thus became available by appointment in the last days of Governor Kirk's administration, and the furor over these "midnight-judge" appointments highlighted the need for a
new judicial article (FLA. CONsT. art. V,§ 6 (1972)) that would abandon the population basis
and return the power to determine the need for new judgeships to the legislature. Responding
to the need for political balance among new judges, the General Assembly also created
additional judgeships to compensate for the appointments made by the outgoing governor,
whose political party was in the minority in the legislature.
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For many states the lessons to be learned from Florida's and
Ohio's experiences may be of little significance. Illinois, Pennsylvania and North Carolina, for example, already are committed to
their own types of restructuring and administration. Tennessee,
with its reluctance to adopt structural unification 7 or even tenure
for appellate judges, 8 exemplifies those states that have resisted all
court reform. Many other states, however, such as Virginia, Kentucky, Georgia, Louisiana, and Wisconsin, have remained uncommitted to either court unification or lay court administration. For
these states the Florida and Ohio results are significant. Achievements in disposition of tort jury cases alone, of course, are not determinative; the changes may have had entirely different effects in
other areas. Nevertheless, it is clear once again that the frequently
posited remedies for courtroom delay have not been entirely successful. Their use should not be adopted lightly.
97. See notes 10-12 supra & accompanying text.
98. After the governor and nominating commission had fumbled badly on the appointment of a supreme court justice in 1972, thereby allowing election of a write-in candidate at
the next polling, the Tennessee legislature repealed TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-714 (1972), which
had provided for incumbent appellate judges, appointed to fill vacancies, to run unopposed
for election, the only question being whether the judge should be retained for the unexpired

term of his predecessor.

